ATJDENREBE

v. RANqDALL.

and the multitude of insolvents who throng the ante-chambers and
portals of the primary and local authorities of the courts of bankruptcy, create influences calculated to interfere with the due
administration of justice. While this is one of the usual and,
perhaps, unavoidable incidents of a system of bankruptcy, it is
not fair to presume that Congress intended by the Bankrupt Law
to withdraw from the creditor the original jurisdiction of the tribunal most likely to be above the reach of such influences, the
benefits of which he had by bill in equity before its enactment.
Such a conclusion should at least not be left to be drawn from
mere implication, but be founded iupon express provision in the
law.
T.W.B.

ircuit Court of the United States, Maine District, April T.
1868.
LEWIS AUDENREID ET AL. v. JOHN F. RANDALL ET AL.
Where the consignee of the cargo bf a vessel at sea, sells the cargo and deliverm
the bill of lading, properly indorsed, to the purchaser, the sal6 is valid and passes
the complete title to the goods.
Delivery of the bill of lading is, under the circumstances, a sufficient delivery
of the goods to take the case*out of the operation of the Statute of Frauds.
If the purchaser afterwards refuse to accept the goods, vendor may sell them and
recover the loss from the purchaser.
On'the 16th of March, at Boston, A. sold to B. h cargo of.coal then at sea, and
delivered to B., properly indorsed, a bill of lading, dated March 13th, at PhiladeIphia, and also a bill of sale of the coal, dated also March 13th, though the -eidence showed that it was in fact made on the 16th, and was part of the transaction
at Roston on that day.. Before the arrival of the coal, B. offered A. one dollar
a ton to take it off his hands, which A. refused. On the arrival of the coal, B.
refused to receive it, and claimed that the c6ntract was within the Statute of Frauds
and void. After soine correspondence, A. sold the coal at public auction, and
brought suit for his loss in the transaction. Held, that he was entitled to recover.
CLIFFORD, J.-Special assumpsit, together with the common
counts as for goods :sold and delivered, and for money had and
received. Substantial charge of the special counts is,. that- the
plaintiffs, at the request of the defendants, on the 16th day
of March 1865, bargained and sold to the, defendants a certain
quantity of coal, called Broadtop coal, being the cargo of the brig
Russian, then on her voyage from Philadelphia to Portland, as
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per bill of lading of the 13th of the same month, amounting
to two hundred and eighty-nine tons; and that the defendants
subsequently, when the vessel arrived with the coal on board,
refused to receive the coal and pay for the same, as they had
agreed to do. Contract price of the coal was eleven dollars and
fifty cents per ton, and freight at six dollars and fifty cents per
ton. Plea was the general issue, but the parties, after the evidence was introduce?, on both sides, withdrew the case from the
jury, by consent, and submitted the same to the court, under the
Act of Congress in such case made and provided. Most of the
material facts are without dispute, and they may be stated in. a
very few words. - Plaintiffs were merchants doing business in
Boston, and the defendants are citizens of Maine doing business
in Portland. Wanting to purchase coal, the defendants, on
the 16th day of March 1865, called on the plaintiffs at their
place of business, and inquired if they, the plaintiffs, had any
soft coal on the way from Philadelphia; of, if not, whether they
would not ship them a cargo of such coal; and being told that
the plaintiffs had just received a bill of lading for a shipment of
such a cargo bound to Portland, the defendants inquiired if it was
for sale, and if so, at what price the plaintiffs would sell the coal.
Price asked was twelve dollars per ton for the coal, and the
freight, which was six dollars and fifty cents per ton; but as
finally agreed; the price, including freight, was eighteen dollars,
Defendants agreed to purchase at that price, and the consignees
named in the bill of lading, A. C. Mbrse & Co., indorsed and
delivered to the defendants the bill of lading, which was introduced in evidence by the plaintiffs. The bill of lading bears
date on the 18th day of March 1865, .and appears to have
been duly executed at Philadelphia on *that day, and the bill of
the coal given by the plaintiffs bears the same date, but the
proofs show that it was written and delivered at Boston at the
time the bill of lading was indorsed and delivered by the cons'gnees, and that it was a part of that transaction. Payment
was to be made in cash, and the plaintiffs proved that they had a
right to draw for the amount at any time. Freights immediately
declined, and the agent of the plaintiffs, one of the consignees,
about a week after the indorsement and delivery of the bill of
lading, being in Portland, where the defendants resided, they
requested him to sell the cargo to some other party, and offered
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to give him one dollar per ton if he would take the coal off of
their hands. Reason assigned for the request by the defendants
was that they should make a loss if they took the coal, but the
agent of the plaintiffs declined to accept the proposition. Proofs
also show that the vessel arrived at Portland March 29th 1865,
with the coal on board in good condition, and that the master
notified the plaintiffs by telegraph of her arrival, and that the
defendants refused_ to receive the coal. On the last day of
March one of the defendants called at the plaintiffs' place of business, and informed them, or one of the consignees, that the vessel
had arrived, and requested them to come to Portland and take
care of the coal or to sell it, and stated at the same time that if
the plaintiffs would do so they would bear a part of the loss, and
that they would make up the residue in other purchases of the=z
in the course of the year. Plaintiffs refused the proposition, dni
the defendants informed them that they, the defendants, would
have nothing to do with the coal. Response of the plaintiffs to
that suggestion was, that the plaintiffs, if they, the defendants,
rdfused to, receive the coal, would sell it on their account and
charge them the difference; They also wrote then to that effect
on the same day, in consequence of a telegram from the master
that the defendants still refused to receive the coal. Correspondence between the parties was- also introduced in evidence, but it
contains nothing in addition which is very material. Letter of
the plaintiffs to the defendants, dated March 31st of the same
year, shows that they received the telegram from the master, and
a letter from the defendants to the plaintiffs, dated the 1st day
of April following, shows that the defendants on that day eiclosed
to the plaintiffs the bill of lading of the cargo and the bill of the
coal which they received at the 'time the contract was made.
Defendants refused to receive the coal, and thereupon the plaintiffs advertised and sold the coal at public auction.
Principal defence is that the contract was within the Statute of
Frauds and void. Contract was made in Massachusetts, and the
statute of that state :provides that no contract' for the sale of
goods, vares, or merchandise, for the price of fifty dollars- o
more, shall be good or valid unless the purchaser accepts and
receives part of the goods so sold, or gives something in earnest
to bind the bargain, or in part payment,.or unless some note o.
memorandum in writing of the bargain is made and rigned-bv the
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party to be charged thereby, or by some person thereunto by
him lawfully authorized: Gen. Stat. 327.
Where the statute does not apply, it may be laid down as a
well-settled general principle that, if the parties have agreed, the
one to buy and the other to sell specific articles of personal property, of which the price, weight, measure, and requisite fitness
are definitely prescribed, or if the terms of the contract provide
suitable means by *hich those qualities or conditions may be
ascertained, and the articles which are the subject of the negotiation are in the state for which the parties contracted, the property
passes eo instanti, by virtue of the contract of sale and without
delivery. Repeated decisions have affirmed the rule that when
the terms of the sale are agreed between the parties, and everything the seller has to do with the. goods is complete, the contract
of sale becomes absolute, as between the parties, without actual
payment of the price or delivery of. the articles, and the property"
and the risk of accident to the goods vest ii the buyer, subject to
certain qualifications. He is entitled to the goods on payment
or tender of the price, and not otherwise, when nothing is said at
the sale as to the time of delivery or the time of payment. But
if the goods are sold upon credit, and the terms of the contract
are silent as to the time of delivery, the vendee is entitled to the
immediate possession, and the right of property vests at once in
the buyer, subject to the seller's right of stoppage in transitu, if
exercised before the .former actually obtains the possession:
Leonard et al. v. Davis et al., 1'Black 483 ; Tome et al. v. Dubois
; 2 Kent Com. (11thT ed.) 658; Hinde v.
et al., 6 Wall.
7
East
571 ; Holmes v. Crane, 2 Pick. 599;
Wliitehouse,
D' Tolf v. Harris,4 Mas. 515 ; Grosvenar,v. Phillips, 2 Hill.

147.
Executory contracts only are the subject of remark on the
present occasion, as it is clear that where the contract has been
in fact fully performed, the rights, duties, and obligations of the
parties resulting from such performance stand unaffected by the
statute: Stone v. Dennison, 18 Pick. 4; Browne on Stat, of F.,
116, p. 118. Although it is true as between the parties that
the property vests in the buyer without delivery, when the bargain is complete and everything is done by the seller which the
terms of the contract prescribed, yet it is equally true, as is perfectly well established, that as against every one except the

AUDENREID v. RANDALL.

vendor, a delivery of possession is necessary in every valid conveyance of personal property: Lanfear v. Sumner, 17 Mass. 110;
f/aldwell v. Ball, 1 Term 205. Actual delivery, however, is
often impracticable from the cumbrous nature of the article, and
sometimes imppssible on account of its situation, or because not
present, as in the case of goods or ships at sea. Symbolical
deliVery will in such cases be sufficient and equivalent in its legal
effect to actual delivery, without the actual manual occupation by
the purchaser: Leonard et al. v. Davis et al., 1 Black 482; 2
Kent Com. (11th ed.) 671; Trostury ff. Co. v.1N. E. Glass Co.,
9 Gush. 118. '
Delivery of the key of the warehouse in which goods sold
are deposited, or transferring them on the books of the* warehouseman or wharfinger to the name of the buyer, is in general
sufficient to transfer the property, under the terms of a proper
contract to that effect: Ohaplin v. Rogers, I East 194; Dodsley
v. Varley, 12 A. & E. 632.
So the delivery of the receipt of the storekeeper for the goods,
being the documentary evidence of the title, has been held to be
a constructive delivery* of the goods: Wilkestal v. Terris, 5
Johns. 885. Timber, logs, or other lumber floatifig in the water,'
are only in the constructive possession of the owner, and under
such circumstances, a symbolical delivery in. case of sale is all
that can be expected, and is amply sufficient, .as between the
parties, to pass the title : Ludwig v. Fallis,17 Me. 166; Boynton
v. Veazie, 24 Me. 288 ; Macomber v. *Parker,13 Pick. 1715.
Mere w ords, however, even in the-case bf cumbrous articles, are
not sufficient to constitute a delivery and acceptance of'gooAs'
such as the statute requires. Superadded to the language of the
contract, there must be some act of the parties amounting to a
transfer of the possession and an acceptance. thereof by the buyer,
as where the seller does some* act by which he relinquishes bis
dominion over the property and'puts it in the power of the buyer:
Shindler v. Houston, 1 Comst. 266. Examples put in that case
as illustrations are where the key of the warehouse was delivred
to the buyer, and where the bailee of the goods was desired- t
deliver them according to the contract. Words only do not constitute either an actual or symbolical delivery within the meaning
of the Statute of Frauds. Extent of the rule, as there laid down,
is that there must be some act of the parties superadded to the
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language of the contract, which amounts to a transfer of the
possession of the goods ; but the court do not deny that a valid
delivery may be made symbolically in cases where an actual
delivery is impossible or impracticable. Undoubtedly a delivery
is necessary to give validity to a sale as against subsequent pur.
chasers or judgment-creditors, but it cannot be admitted that in
cases where an actual manual occupation of the articles is impossible, as in case of goods or ships at sea, or in case of cumbrous
articles, no legal delivery can be made. Such a delivery is legal
-and sufficient to pass the title, when- made in the usual manner
and by the usual symbol, fitted to prevent fraud and give certainty
to- the transaction. Valid sale of personal property, as against
subsequent purchasers and judgment-creditors, is sufficient to
take the case out of the operation of the Statute.of Frauds, if it
appears that the title became absolute in the buyer, discharged of
all liens on the part of the seller. When goods are sold at sea,
the indorsement and the delivery of the bill of lading to the
buyer, and the acceptance of the same by him under the contract,
are. the proper substitutes for an actual delivery and acceptance
of the goods, and have the effect to vest a perfect title in the
buyer, discharged of all right of stoppage in transitu on the part
of the seller and indorser of the bill of lading: Newsom v. Thornton, 6 East 41; Prattv. Parkman, 24 Pick. -42. Right of
stoppage in transitu was conceded to the seller in Order to prevent'the injustice which would take place if, in consequence of
the vendee's insolvency while the price of the goods' was yet
unpaid, they were to be seized and appropriated in satisfaction
of his other liabilities, to the prejudice of the rights of his unpaid
vendor. The vendor's right in respect to his price is not a mere
lien which he will forfeit if he parts with the possession, but
grows out of his original ownership and dominion. Such a right
attaches to goods sold on credit, where nothing is agreed on as
to the time of delivery. In that state of the case, the vendee is
immediately entitled to the possession, and the property and the
right of possession vest at once in him; but his right of possession
is not absolute, because it is liable to be defeated if he becomes
insolvent before he obtains the absolute control of the goods:
Bloxam v. Sanders, 4 B. & C. 948; Tooke v. Hollingworth, 5
Term 215; Liclkbarrow v. Mason, 5 Term 683.
Goods may be stopped in tranaituso long as the transit con-
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tinues, whether by land or water, from the consignor to the
consignee, and whether they are in the hands of the carrier,
warehouse-keeper, wharfinger, or any other middleman connected
with the transportation; but the right of stoppage ceases when
the goods have reached their place of destination, and have come
to the actual or constructive possession of the consignee: Oovell
v. fitcheock, 23 Wend. 613 ; Mottram v. ffeyer, 1 Den. 487;
Smith Mer. L. 683. Possession, actual 'or constructive, defeats
the right of stoppage in transitu, and the bill of lading becomes
functus officio as soon as the goods are landed and warehoused in
the name of the holder, as he then becomes possessed of the goods
themselves in the eye of the law, and derives his power, not from
the bill of lading, but from such possession. Nothing can be
more certain than the rule that, as between the consignor and
consignee on the one side, and third parties on the other,'the
indorsement ancd delivery of the bill of lading by the consignee
of goods at sea, and the acceptance of the same by the buyer,
under a contract made in good faith, defeats the right of stoppage
ih transit by the consignor. Settled rule is, that in such cases,
where there.has been a sale by the consignee which would give a
title to the vendee as against the consignor, independently of the
indorsement of the bill of lading, the effect of the indorsement
will be td take away that right, even in cases where it would
otherwise exist: Caurney vi Behrend, 8 E. & B. 622; Pennel v.
Alexander, 8 E. & B. 282. Regarded as consignees, theref6re.
it is clear that the plaintiffs never had any right of stoppage ir
transtu, as the terms of the sale were absolute, and the indorsement and delivery of the bill of lading by Morse & Co. were
absolute and unconditional. Suggestion may be made that Morse
& Co. were only agents of the plaintiffs, and that the latter were
in fact the shippers and owners of the coal. Suppose that to be
so, and even suppose that they are not estopped to deny that the
bill of lading expresses their true relation to the goods ; still it
can make no difference in this case, as tJae vessel had arrived,
and the master had notified the defendants that'he was ready to
deliver the cargo, and the plaintiffs two days afterwards .affirme'd
the sale, and insisted that the defendants were bound by the con
tract: Rowley v. Bigelow, 12 Pick. 807; ,Craven v. Ryder, 6
Taunt. 433. Bad faith is not imputed in this case, and the Supreme Court, speaking to the precise point under consideration,
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say that by the well-settled principles of commerciai law, the
consignee in the bill of lading is constituted the authorized agent
of the owner, whoever he may be, to receive the goods, and by
his indorsement of the bill of lading to a bond fide purchaser for a
valuable consideration, without notice of any adverse intent, the
latter becomes as against all the world the owner of the goods.
It mqtters not whether the consignee in such a case be the buyer
of the goods, or the factor or agent of the owner. His transfer
in such a case is equally capable of divesting the property of the
owner and vesting it in the indorsee c-f the bill of lading: Conraa
v. Atlantic Ins. Co., 1-Pet. 445. Same court held, in Gibson v.
Stevens, 8 How.-399, that where personal property is, from its
character or situation at the time of the sale, incapable of actual
delivery, the delivery of the bill of sale or other muniment of
title is sufficient to, transfer the property and possession to the
vendee. Transactions of that character, say the court, if in tho
usual course of trade, and free from all suspicion of bad faith,
have the effec*t t6 transfer the legal title and constructive possession of the property to the purchaser; and the court expressiy
affirm the doctrine, that ships at sea may be transferred to a
purchaser by the delivery of the bill of sale, and that goods at
sea may be transferred by the indorsement, and delivery of the
bill of lading; and TANEY, Oh. J., adds, that'it ishardly'necessary
to refer to adjudged cases to -prove a doctrine so familiar- in the
courts: Grove v. Brien et al., 8 How. 436. Actual delivery is
a manual transfer of the commodity sold to the vendee, and ope.
rates to transfer the title in all cases, unless it be made upon a
condition which prevents such a consequence. So a delivery to
a comm6n carrier, in the usual course of business, is a sufficient
delivery to the vendee, but the right of stoppage in transitu
remains in the vendor: Stanton v. Gayer, 16 Pick. 467. But
the bond fide transferee for value of a bill of lading, indorsed by
the consignee of the shipper, takes an absolute title to the goods,
free from the equitable right of the unpaid vendor to stop the
goods in transitu as against the purchaser. The obvious reason
of the rule is, that by such a transfer of the bill of lading, the
transitusis regarded as ended, and the right of stoppage, therefore,
is gone: Story on Sales, § 344, p. 414; Dows v. Greene, 24 N.
Y. 641; Dows v. Perrin,16 N. Y. 325; Gurney v. Behrend,
3 E. & B. 622-637.
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Views of Mr. Browne are, that in order t6 work an acceptance
and receipt of goods purchased, it is not necessary that there
should be an actual manual possession of them by the buyer; and
te affirms that the statute requires no other acts of acceptance
and receipt than such as are consistent with the nature, locality,
and condition of the goods. Substance of his proposition is, that
the statute will be satisfied with symbolical' acceptance and receipt
of the goods, when the case admits of no*other delivery; and he
expressly states that, in the case of a ship or cargo at sea, the
delivery and acceptance of the bill of sale or the bill of lading,
will suffice to perfect the transfer: Browne on St. of F., § 318;
Badlam v. Tucker, 1 Pick. 389 ; Gardinerv. Hfowland, 2 Pick.
599 ;.Brinley v. ,t'jing, 7 Greenl. R. 241. Acceptance and receipt of inaccessible and ponderous or bulky articles may be legally
accomplished, in the view of the commentator, by the performance
of any act which shows that the seller has parted with the right
and claim to control the property, and that the purchaser has
acquired. that right: Boynton v. Jeazie, 24 Me. 236 ; Bailey v.
Ogden, 3 Johns. 424; _9dan v. Dudfield, 1 A. & E. N. S.
302.
Proposition of the defendants is, whera manual possession of
the goods is not taken by the buyer, that "there must be something morb than would be stfficient to constitute a: delivery and
to change the property at common law ;" and if by that it is.only
meant that a-sale may be valid at common law, as between 'the
parties, and the contract still be within the Statute of Frauds, the
proposition may well be admitted. Subject to that qualification,
the proposition is doubtless correct in cases where there is no
actual delivery; -but if the proposition is understood to include
cases by parol contract, where theri is a delivery, though symbolical, yet sufficient to transfer the property, not only as between
the parties, but as against the creditors of the seller and sub.
sequent purchasers, and to the'exclusion of the right of stoppage
in transitu, then the correctness of the, proposition cannot be
admitted. Possession as matter of law is not in abeyance it is
somewhere, and if it is not in the seller it must, in contemplatibn
of law, be in the buyer; and if so,then it is clear that.the case
is not within the Statute of Frauds. Recent English decisions, it
is contended by the defendants, assert a different doctrine; but
the cases cited, upon careful scrutiny, do not appear to support
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any such conclusion. Take, for example, the case of Aferedith
v. Heigh, 2 E. & B. 365, which is the first in the series referred
to as maintaining the proposition. Statement of the case shows
that the defendants at Handley, on the 12th of April 1850, verbally ordered from the agent of the plaintiff at that place a cargo
of china stone-clay, requesting the agent to send it by sea, consigned to certain public carriers at Liverpool, for the defendants,
and to be insured, by the plaintiff on their account. Plaintiff
resided at Cornwall, and the ordinary mode of transportation was
by sea to the Mersey, and thence by inland navigation. Both
par.ties knew that the company named as carriers were engaged
in-transporting goods from the Mersey to the defendants' place
of business. Pursuant to the'order, the cargo .was sent by a
vessel selected. by the plaintiff, and on the 18th of April an unsigned copy of the bill of lading was forwarded to the inland
carriers, with directions that when they received the bill of lading
they should forward the cargo. Shipm~nt was completed the
22d of April, and the bill of lading, duly signed, was sent as
directed in the order. On that day the vessel sailed, and on the
26th of the same month she was lost. Notice of shipment was
given to'the defendants, but they remained silent, and there was
no evidence that they ever saw the bill of lading. Held, that the
delivery to-the master of the vessel selected by the plaintiff was
not a delivery to the defendants, and that the silence of .the defendants did not alter .their situation, as there was nothing in the
circumstances which required them to take any a~tion in the
premises. Some of the judges thought that.the case might have
been different if the bill of lading had been received by the
defendants themselves, and especially if they had dealt with it,
or had in any respect acted as -the owners of the goods. ERLE,J.,
said, "I have no doubt that the bill of lading, -which is the symbol of property, may be so received and dealt with as to be
equivalent to an actual receipt of the property itseyf," and the
Court of Queen's Bench, in the case of Currie v. Anderson, 2
E. & E. 593, subsequently so held, although the bill of-lading
was made out in the name of the plaintiffs. Adjudged cases may
be found which seem to imply that there cannot be such an acceptance and receipt of the goods by the buyer as will take the case
out of the statute, unless he has examined the goods or done
something to preclude him from contending that they do not
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correspond with the contract, but the converse of that proposition
is now well-settled law: Norton v. Tibbet7, 15 A. & E. N. S.
428 ; Parkerv. Wallis, 87 Eng. L. & Eq. 26; .Fitzhugh v. Williams, 5 Seld. 565.
Next case cited by the defendants is that of Bill v. Bament, 9
Mees. & W. 86, which is a case where the sale was for ready
mon'ey, in which the plaintiff was not bound to deliver until the
payment of the price; and inasmuch as there had been no delivery,
the court held that there was no evidence to go to the jury to
satisfy the Statute of Frauds. Reference is also made to the case
of Norman v. Phillips, 14 Mees. & W. 278, which was a verbal
order for timber, directing it to be sent to a railway station and
forwarded to a described place, as had been the practice between
the parties in previous dealings. The timber was sent and
arrived at its place of destination, but the defendant, when notified
of its arrival; refused to take it. When it arrived it was unaccompanied by an invoice, but one was sent in a few days, which
was received by the defendant, and he kept it for a period exceedhig a month, and then informed the plaintiff that he declined taking
the timber.. Verdict was for the plaintiff. Rule to set it aside
aind enter a nonsuit was granted, which was made absolute, as the
evidence was not sufficient to warrant a verdict. Reliance is
also placed upon the case of 'arina v. Home, 16 Mees. & W.
119, although its application is not apparent. Plaintiff shipped
goods upon the verbal order of the defendant to his own agent,
who stored them and indorsed the warehouseman's receipt to the
defendant, who kept it for some months, but denied that he had
ordered the goods, and refused to pay the charges onc them.
Held, that there was no delivery, the warehouseman's' possession
being considered to be that of the'consignee, notwithstanding the
endorsement of the receipt, until the warehouseman attorned to
the vendee. Comment need not bb made upon adjudged cases,
where it appears that the goods remained in the possession of The
vendor, as it is evident that they do not s.upport the proposition
of the defendants in this case: Castle et al. v. Sworder, 5 H. &
N. 281.
Certain other cases are also referred to, which decide that a
delivery of goods ordered to a carrier, without more, is not such
a delivery to the buyer as will take the contract out of the opera
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tion of the Statute of Frauds, which is doubtless correct, as in that
state of the case there is no acceptance of the goods, actual or
symbolical, and they are still subject to the right 6f stoppage in
transi
by the seller, and every objection as to quality or
quantity by the buyer: Coombs v. B. & -. B. B. Co., 3 H. &
N. 510 ; Outwater v. -Dodge,6 Wend. 400; Howard v. Borden,
13 Allen 300. Decided cases, where it appears not only that the
defendant did not accept the goods sent under an order, but that
he refused to do so, need no comment; and if it appears that he
.merely examined the goods to ascertain their quality or quantity,
it cannot make any difference, as in such cases there is no evidence of acceptance: Kent v. Hutchingson, 3 B. & P. 232.
When goods are in the custody of a third person, an order for
delivery, with notice to that person, is sufficient to pss the
property, even as against the attaching creditors of the vendor:
Tuxworth v. Moore, 9 Pick. 34T; Carter v. Williard, 19 Pick
1; Burge v. Cone, 6 Allen 412; Boardma¢i v. Spooner et al., 13
Allen 357; Whitaker v. Sumner, 20 Pick. 405. Assent by the
party,. however, in whose custody the goods are, it is said, is
necessary to constitute acceptance and receipt under the Statute
of Frauds ; but if the parties agree that he shall be considered, as
between them, the bailee of the buyer, it is not perceived how the
acts of the bailee can defeat the sale: Beital v. Benn, 3 3. &
0. 423 ; Farinav. Home, 16 M. & W. 119. Text writers agree
that'a mere delivery of the bill of lading is not enough; without'
a distinct acceptance of the same by the purchaser; buf anything
amounts to a delivery and acceptance, says Parsons, which was
intended to be so, and was received as such, and which virtually
puts the goods within the reach and power of the buyer; and
among the. cases enumerated -by the author where symbolical
delivery is sufficient, is that of the indorsement and delivery of a
bill of lading: Pars. Mer." L. 75. Most recent text writers in
England also maintain the same views, and there is no decision
to the contrary: Maclachl. on Ship. 341; M. & P. on Ship. 143;
Chitty on C. & M. 403; Liclebarrow v. Mason, 6 East 23.
Argument of the defendants is, that there is no difference between
the case at bar and that of an ordinary order ; but it is not possible -to adopt that suggestion, as a different rule prevailed for a
century before the revolution. The consignee of a bill of lading,
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said HOLT, Oh. J., has such a property that he may assign it
over: -Evansv. Martell, 1 Ld. Raymond 271. If the goods are
bond fide sold by the factor at sea (as they may be where no
delivery can be given), the sale, said Lord MANSFIELD, will be
good, and the vendee shall hold them by virtue of the bill of sale,
though no actual possession is delivered: Wright v. Campbell, 4
Burf. 2046; Davis et al. v. Bradley et al., 28 Yt. 121. Indorsement and delivery of a bill of lading passes no title, if the
instrument was stolen, or if the consignor'was..not the owner of
the goods ; but if. the assignment was bond fide, the transfer,
delivery, and acceptance of the symbol transfers everything which
it represents: Newsom v. Thornton, 6 East 41. Acceptance in
such a case is the acceptance of the goods, and has the effect to
take the case out of the operation of the Statute of Frauds, as it
vests the absolute dominion of the goods in the buyer, and the
right-of stoppage in transitw ceases from that moment: Dows v.
Green, 24: N. Y. 642. Even suppose it were otherwise, still the
plaintiffs would be entitled to judgment in this case, in view of
the special circumstances set forth in the statement. Delivery
of the bill of lading, together with the bill of the coal, was made
at the date of the contract. Subsequent conduct of the defendants clearly shows that they regarded -the transfer of the property
as complete, as they offered -to pay the plaintiffs one dollar per
ton to take it back and release them from the contract. Although
the plaintiffs refused to do as requested, still the defendants
retained the bill of lading and the bill of parcels, without any
intimation that they should not receive the cargo. They substantially repeated the request after the 'vessel arrived, and ihe
same being again, refused, they still retained the muniments of
title until'the 1st of April, when they were returned as described
in the statement. ' Due notice wag given of the time of the sale
of the cargo; and it was properly sold as required in such cases.
Plaintiffs are entitled to judgment.
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It is a well-settlad rule in the law of sales of personal property that when any.
thing remains to be done as between buyer and seller there is no delivery so as to
cut off the right of stoppagi in transitu, or the right of detention for unpaid purchase-money. It is not necessary that the act remaining to be done should determine the quantity or the quality of the goods sold, but it may be any act whatsnever, within the contemplation of the parties to the contract.
A. purchased goods warehoused in a bonded warehouse from the importer, B.,
*in whose name they were entered. The goods *ere bought on a credit at a specified price, and the duties were to be paid by A. as a part of the price. He had
withdrawn by permission of B., parcels of the goods at different times, paying the
duties on such parcels. Before the credit expired B. gave to A. an order on the
bonded warehouseman to transfer the residue of the goods to A.'s name, which
was done accordingly. As between the parties and the government, the gdods still
remained in B.'s name. They could only be withdrawn under the regulations of
the treasury department, by a "withdrawal entry," signed by B. or by some one
authorized by him in writing. While the goods were in this condition the purchaser, A., became insolvent. He demanded that B. should sign the inecessary
withdrawal entry,. which the latter refused to do, except upon full payment of the
price. •
Held, that an act remained to be done as between buyer and seller of such a
nature that there was no delivery either actual or constructive, and that B. had a
right of detention of the goods for the unpaid purchase-money.
Hdd, further, that an action in equity would not lie to compel B. to sign the
requisite withdrawal entry, since there was no trust created by the transaction, in
the absence of payment or its equivalent.

BEFORE Hons. WIuIIAm F. ALLEN, JOSEPH S. BOSWORTH, and

W. DWIGHT, referees.
Action in equity to compel the defendants to sign a withdrawal
entry.
THEODORE

Platt, Gerard & Buckley, for plaintiffs.
Henry .Nicoll, for defendants.
BY THE REFEREEs.-The facts in this case are briefly these

The plaintiffs were, at the time of the transactions hereafter
detailed, partners in trade carrying on business as jobbers, in teas
in the city of New York and the defendants were also partners
doing business in the same city as importers of teas.
On the 20th of August 1867 the defendants through the agency
of brokers sold to the plaintiffs a quantity of teas amounting to
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2388 half chests, imported by them in the bark Japan. Sixty.
one of these chests were subsequently rejected by mutual consent,
as damaged, leaving the number actually sold 2327. These were
warehoused in bond in the defendants' name, with the exception
of 26 half chests, which having been retained by the defendants
as sample chests, and the duties having been paid by them, were
directly transferred to the plaintiffs.
These teas were all marked alike, and were parcel of a larger
importation entered by the defendants under one warehouse entry.
The controversy in this case concerns a portion of the 2301
chests. They were warehoused with Snyder & Sons, who kept a
private bonded warehouse in the city of New York, duly authorized- under the regulations of the United States Treasury Department.
The teas were sold on a credit of sixty days to the plaintiffs at
a fixed price-per pound. The duties at 25 cents per pound were
to be paid by the plaintiffs, and the amount thus paid was to be
credited as a cash payment on the teas. The plaintiffs were to
have the benefits of the unexpired storage and of the fire insurance running to September 1st. A bill of parcels was furnished
to the plaintiffs, specifying the numbers of the chests sold, their
net weight, price, and terms of sale.The United States treasury regulations concerning bonded warehouses are such, that until the duties are paid -the goods are in
the joint custody of the warehouseman and of an oflicer of the 6ustoms, at the charge and risk of the importer and subject at all
times to his order on the payment of the duties.
The defendants, through their attorney in fact, cont~mpora.
neiusly with their entry of the goods gave a bond required by
law conditioned for the payment of duties, &c-.
By the course of business at the custom-house, whenever it is
desired to withdraw the goods*in bond or a portion of them from
the warehouse, a "1withdrawal entry'" is made. This must be
signed either by the person in whose name the goods are warehoused or by some person duly authorized by that'party in writing.
Thereupon, on payment of the duties, the goods may be witgdrawn, and a " permit" is issued by the collector to the store
keeper of the port directing the goods to be delivered from the
warehouse.
Under this practice 500 chests of the tea had been withdrwn
VOL. XVi.-43
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by the defendants on the application of the plaintiffs at three
several times: 300 on the 24th of August; 100 on the 3d of
September, and 100 on the 7th of September. The gold to pay
the duties was supplied by the plaintiffs, but nothing was paid to
the defendants on account of the teas.
On the 3d of September the defendants gave the plaintiffs an
order on Snyder & Sons, directing them to transfer to the plain.
tiffs all the sound teas which had been sold to them.
Snyder & Sons contemporaneously gave a receipt to the plain.
tiffs of the following tenor: " Received from bark Japan, trans.
ferred from the account' of E. Pavenstedt & Oo., on storage in
Snyder & Sons' stories, subject to the order of [the plaintiffs] 2179
half chests tea, marked, &c." At the same date the plaintiffs
insured for $25,000 gold, the former insurance having expired
September 1st.
Such was the effect of these transactions that there were 1801
chests of tea, parcel of the entire purchase, held by Snyder &
Sons, and not withdrawn from the bonded warehouse, on the 14th
of Septbmber 1867. On that day the plaintiffs became insolvent.
After that date, and before the commencement of this action, the
plaintiffs applied to the defendants either to withdraw the teas
themselves, or to permit the plaintiffs to withdraw them. At the
same time they offered the gold necessary to pay the duties. The
defendants declined this proposition unless they were paid the
amount due to them for-the tea, on the ground of the insolvency
of the plaintiffs, whereupon this action was brought.
The only questions presented on these facts are, whether the
title to and possession of the teas have passed so completely to
the plaintiffs that the defendants cannot retain them for the unpaid
purchase-money, and whether the latter can be compelled in equity
to sign a withdrawal entry so that a permit may. be issued from
the custom-house to allow the plaintiffs to take the teas into their
actual possession.
It is urged on the part of the plaintiffs that the ownership of
the teas had passed to them, and that in point of law delivery had
taken place so as to defeat any lien for unpaid purchase-moriey or
to prevent any stoppage in transitu. They urge that nothing
remained to be done between the parties to the 'contract, and that
the indorsement of the warehouse entry was simply a matter
between the defendants and a third party, viz., the government.
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They claim that the defendants became bailees or trustees of the
warehouse documents, holding them subject to the plaintiffs' control. They say that the question of delivery is one of intention,
to be inferred from all the facts in the case, and that the facts
that the goods were sold on credit; that the duties were payable
by the purchasers; that the benefit of the unexpired storage and
fire- insurance was made over to them, and the withdrawal of the
500 chests at the plaintiffs' request, all unequivocally show that
there was a complete intention to deliver the teas. The effect of
these acts, they insist, cannot be overcome by the non-performance
of a ministerial formal act like counting or weighing goods or
indorsing a warehouse entry.
The defendants say on their part that the lien of the vendor for
unpaid purchase-money or the extension of it known as stoppage
in transitu,is to be tfeated with favor and should receive a liberal
construction---that there is a marked distinction between the passing of. the title or right of property upon, a contract of sale and
the vesting the purchaser with the possession of the thing sold.
They admit that the title to the tea vested in the plaintiffs, but
say that the possession had never been actually or constructively
transferred to them, and that the plaintiffs could not obtain possession without a further and material act on the part of the
defendants. They insist that though the ownership has passed,
the contract is still executory as to the possession, and that the
acts of Snyder & Sons were inchoate and incomplete and wered of
no effect until the withdrawal entry was made, and that the true
test to determine whether a change of possession has been effected
or not is, to.ascertain whether anything remains to be done by the
vendor.
It should be remarked that this case is disembarrassed of some
of the considerations which have aifected other cases arising under
this branch of the law. In many instances, the rights of second
or sub-purchasers have been involved, and the courts have protected them by the doctrine of equitable estoppel, or other rule
favorable to them. These plaintiffs, the original purchasers; ask
a court of equity to interfere actively so as to deprive the. defendants of the control of goods for which the former have not paid,
do not offer to pay, cannot pay anything. There are certainly no
"persuasive" equities in their favor, and they must rest their
claim on a technical rule of law.
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We hold that the authorities establish the following prop6sitions:1st. On a contract for the sale of goods and chattels, there.
results to the vendor, out of the contract itself, a right to detain
the goods as security for the price of them, on the vendee becom
ing insolvent while the goods remain in the actual possession of
the vendor. In such a case the right exists notwithstanding the
contract has been consummated so that the title to the goods has
become vested in the vendee, and all risk from their depreciation
or destruction, not imputable to the misconduct or neglect of the
vendbr, has been cast on the vendee.
2d. So, too, though the goods may have passed out of the
actual possession of the vendor and be in transit from him to the
vendee, yet if, when the insolvency occurs, they have not come to
the possession of the vendee, but are in the possession of a cafrier
or other intermediary, the vendor may stop the goods, resume the
possession, and hold them as security for the unpaid purchasemoney.
3d. Where t6e goods, at the time the contract of sale is made,
though in the legal custody and control are not in the actual possession of the vendor, but are so situated that the purchaser cannot obtain actual possession until a specific act is done by the
vendor, if the vendee becomes insolvent before this act has been
done, and the actual possession of the goods has not been changed,
the vendor may detain the goods as security for the payment of
the contract price, and as a consequence, -will not be compelled by
a court of equity to perform the act in question. The right of
detention in case of the intervening insolvency of the vendee,
may be exercised by the vendor so long as the vendee has neither
obtained actual possession nor been furnished by the vendor with
the exclusive means and power of controlling the possession.
We think that the case before us belongs to the class included
within the proposition last stated.
In discussing it, it will not be unprofitable to recall some elementary rules in the law of sales. As far as the passing of the
title is concerned, the contract of sale may be executed or executory, and it is now well settled that where, by the agreement,
the vendor is to do anything to the goods for the purpose of putting them into the state in which the purchaser is to be bound to
eceive them, or where anything remains to be done for the pur-
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pose of ascertaining the price where the price is to depend on
the quantity or quality of the goods, no title passes, and the conTract is executory: Blackburn on Sales 152.
The title, however, may pass and the ownership be transferred,
and still the sale may be imperfect as to the possession. "The
parties may by the terms of their agreement bargain that the
right of property shall vest in the purchaer forthwith, but that
the right of possession shall remain with the vendor until the
fulfilment of any conditions they please :" Id. 198.
Such a condition may not only be express, but may be implied
from the circumstances of the case. Thus the parties in an ordinary sale are presumed to make the payment of the price contemporaneous with the delivery of the possession, and the possession cannot be had without the payment, though the ownership is
transferred.
The authorities establish that a condition preceding delivery may
be implied whenever an act remains to be done by the vendor.
It is not necessary, as urged by the plaintiffs, that this- act
should be with a view to ascertain quality or quantity. That may
be a proper-test to determine whether ownership -has passed, but
it is not a sufficient test to determine whether the right to the
possession has passed. In Owen8on v. Morse, 7 Durnford & East
60, the purchaser had bought articles of plate at an dscertained
price. He wished to have his arms engraved upon the plate,
which the seller agreed to have done at his own expense by an
engraver whom he usually employed. The plate, after being
engraved, was to be returned to the seller. , It was held that the
delivery to "theengraver was not such a delivery to the purchaser
as to cut.off the right of detention. It was said by one member
of the court that the seller, though he might recover of the purchaser for " goods bargained and sold," could n6t recover of him
for " goods sold and delivered." This case, of course, decides in
principle that if the engraving had been done by the seller instead
of a third person, he would not have been a mere bailee to do the
engraving, and it holds that the act to be done was a condition
precedent to delivery. It justifies the remark of Lord Bli6uGHAU
in Cowasjee v. Thompson, 3 Moore, India App. 422, that "if
anything remains to be done between the -buyer and seller, the
goods may be stopped."
The most, favorable rule which can be suggested for the plain-
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tiffs is, to hold that the possession has passed if the goods are
under the control of the vendee so that he can reduce them into
actual possession without any act of the vendor. If they could
have got possession simply by paying duties to the United States
without any act on the vendor's part, it might be admitted in the
absence of special circumstances, that they had the constructive
possession, which they'might on payment make an actual possession. This, perhaps, *maybe inferred from Portalisv. Tetleyq, 5
Law Rep. Eq. Cases 140 (A. D. 1868). It was there held that a
factor who had pledged goods for less than their value had them
still in "his possession" and control so that he could pledge them
for further advances under the "Factors' Act." Vice-Chancellor
WooD held, in substance, that as the pledge could be redeemed at
any time, by payment of the debt, the goods were in the factor's
possession and control' subject to the debt being paid off.
What then are the acts in the present .case which precede
delivery? One is the necessity on the part of the vendor of
making a withdrawal entry; the other is a duty on the part of the
vendee,'imposed upon him by the contract, of paying the duties.
The effect of the first of these acts remaining unperformed is
well illustrated in the cases under the English Warehousing Acts.
The practice under these acts is so different. from our own that
the authorities must be applied with the greatest caution.
This practice in the case of imported goods is well 'detailed in
the recent case of Pearson v. Dawson, 1 Ellis; Blackburn &
Ellis R. 447. It is there said, in the statement of facts by the
reporter: "1It is not the practice for the officers of the customs
to notice any change of ownership. Theyretain their control
over the goods until the duty is paid, after which they leave it to
the warehousekeeper to deliver the goods to the person entitled
to them. Any original purchaser or sub-purchaser who required
[a parcel of the goods] to be delivered to him had to obtain an
order in writing signed by the defendant addressed to his warehousekeeper to deliver the parcel, and on presenting the order so
signed the parcel would be delivered accordingly if the duty had
been paid, and without such an order no one could obtain the
delivery of a single parcel :" p. 449.
This order on the warehouseman, known as "1the delivery order,"
is the only act necessary to be done by the vendor. The vendee
having the order can immediately reduce the goods to his actual
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possession by paying duties. This-is in marked contrast to our
system, where the order by the vendor on the bonded warehouseman of itself accomplishes nothing, but there must be in addition,
as a vital prerequisite, a withdrawal entry signed by the vendor.
Under the English system, this act is to be done between the
vendee and the government.
This course of business, slightly modified in connection with
the warehousing of spirits under the Excise Acts, came under
discussion in the Irish cases of Haig v. Wallace, 2 Hudson &
Brooke 671 (A. p. 1831); Orr v. Murdock, 2 Irish Com. Law
R. N. S. 9 (A. D. 1851); and In re Thomas Bugheg, 12 Irish
Chan. 450, 463 (A. D. 1861).
In. the first and leading case of Haig v. Wallace, the plaintiffs
were the owners of goods in a bonded warehouse which had been
deposited by them as distillers. The goods, twenty puncheons of
spirits, were. sold to one Meade on a credit, who received a "delivery order" upon the warehouseman, who made a transfer in his
books to the purchaser. Soon after ten more puncheons were sold
with a like delivery order and transfer by the warehouseman.
Three of the puncheonsi having been sold to a sub-purchaser, were
withdrawn from bond. It appeared that though a document called
6, "request note," which answers to our " withdrawal entry," was
necessary on the part of the seller, yet that as soon as the "delivery order" was granted, the purchaser was authorized by law
or custom to sign in thie seller's name - pp. 673, 674.
The court held, on this state of facts, that the goods were delivered and that the -seller had no right of detention, notwithstanding the insolvency of the purchaser. The distinction which
we seek to enforce is expressly taken. Says the court: "If a
constructive possession be given to the vendee by the vendor, the
right of stoppage in transitu is" precluded, and in this case the
vendor had no possession himself but a constructive one, for the
actual possession remained in the officer, and the vendor by the
order of delivery gave that which he had, subject to the claims of
the crown, to which the vendee became liable instead of him. If,
indeed, an act by the vendor were afterwards necessary towards
giving actualpossession of any part of the goods to. th'e'vendee,
and if the request note necessary for that purpose were in fact
the act of the vendor, it would be different, but that is not so :
the request note is the act of the vendee using the name of the
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vendor, and the officer receives it as such and acts upon it' and
delivers the permit upon it, without any interference or further
participation in the transaction by the vendor after his giving the
first order for delivery :" pp. 684, 685.
So In re Hughes, supra, it is said that "the delivery orders
form a complete title for possession in the person to whom they
are given by the vendor, that is, the revenue officer acts upon
them, allowing the party named to pay duty and draw the goods
without any further act being done by the [vendor] :" p. 464.
Again: "The goods are in possession pf the crown. The distillei
has not actual possession of them. That possession so remains
until the duty is paid. * * Every act of the distiller [vendor]
has been done to complete the contract :" p. 466.
It may well be doubted whether these cases are not too favorable to the purchaser. The court in Haig v. Wallace misconceived one material fact. The vendor did not cease to be liable
on his bond for the duties, and the right -of retention ought to
continue in that case until the duties are paid. See remarks of
PENNEFATHER; B., in Orr v. Murdock, supra,p. 19. Be this as
it may, these decisions show conclusively that the British courts
would not hold, under our Warehousing Acts and practice, that a
"delivery order" accepted by the bonded warehouseman was
equivalent to a delivery, so long as -the withdrawal entry had not
been signed... These cases fully explain the remark of Lord
CAMPBELL, cited by the plaintiffs from AeEwen v. Smith, 2'
House of Lords Cases 809, 330, that if the goods had bhen transferred on the warehouse-keeper's books, there would have been a
sufficient delivery to cut off the vendor's lien. It has reference
to the effect of a "delivery order" under the practice already
detailed. The Scotch courts take the same view of the effect of
the delivery order: Remarks of judges passim in JZelEwan v.
Smith in the Scotch courts, 9 Court of Session R. N. S. 434.
The position of an English merchant before granting any
delivery order is quite analogous to the present case. The sale
may be complete, yet if the duties are to be paid as a part of the
price and they have not been actually paid, or if the merchant
has not signed tie delivery order, as between buyer and seller
+
there is no delivery.
In Winks v. Hassall, 9 Barn. & Cress. 372, A. had two pipes
%)fwine in a bonded warehouse standing in B.'s name in the cus-
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tom.nouse books, who had given a bond for the payment of the
duties. A. sold the wine to 0. and gave him a delivery order.
it was agreed that C. should pay the duties. B. was subsequently
called upon to pay the duties on. his bond, and removed the goods
to his own warehouse. They had not been transferred from his
name to that of the purchaser. The court held that the lien continued even though warehouse rent was charged by B. to C., and
that it had not been waived by the delivery order, since the goods
had never been transferred from B.'s name. No point was made
as to the bonded warehouseman, but the whole case turned upon
the position that the goods were still entered in B.'s name.
PARKE, J., said that "by the contract the bankrupt was to pay a
certain price for the wine and the duty also. The duty was, in
substance, an additional part of the price to be paid before the
vendee could have possession. * * The seller did not waive
his right of lien by the delivery order, for no transfer was made."
Meaning no transfer with B.
En the Scotch ' case of Smith v. -Pointer,22 Cases in Court of
Session 208 (A. D. 1860), the facts were that goods had been
sold'so as to pass the ow'nership, and theywere sent to a bonded
warehouse by the seller, and entered in the custom-house books
in his name. The name of the purchaser being marked on the
casks, the bonded warehouseman entered them. in his books in the
purchaser's name. The purchaser then gave a delivery order on
the warehouseman, who made delivery accordingly. It was lield,
in an action by the seller against the'warehouseman, that the
question was the same as between the seller and .purchaser,
and that there could be no delivery without a delivery order from
the seller. The court said: "A complete personal contract of
sale is sorhiething quite different from the fulfilment of that contract."
It is true that the court reached a 'different conclusion in Pearson v. Jawson, " E. B. & B. 447, as between the seller and'a
sub-purchaser. In. that case the vendor kept a bonded warehouse.
The purchaser from him of twenty hogsheads of sugar gave an
order in favor of his own -sub-purchaser upon him (the seller) as
warehouseman. This order the seller accepted by an entry on
his books. The sub-purchaser called upon, him for a delivery
order from time to time, which he furnishejd. Fourteen hogsheads
of sugar remained when the purchaser became insolvent. ' These
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w,.ere entered in the vendor's name, and.no delivery order had been
granted. The court held that as against the sub-vendees there
ccould be no retention of the sugar. As against the original ven-es, who had given an acceptance in payment which had beer,
dishonored, it was said that there was a contingent right of deten
tion analogous to stoppage in transitu. This might have been
preserved as against the sub-vendees by notice. As no notice was
given, the equitable, right was lost as against an honest pur
chaser. The remarks of the judges are clear to the point that
the entry in the warehouse books as between the vendor and yen
dee would have had no effect. It was said by Lord CAMPBELL
that the entry in the custom-house left a technical possession in
the vendor: p. 453. The remark thai the lien against the subvendees might have been preserved by notice, shows that the court
must have supposed that it existed as against the vendee, for, of
course, no notice to him would be necessary.
These cases appear to us to show that the British authorities
are of one accord in maintaining the propositions, that a manual
signing, of the delivery order is essential even though the ownership has passed ; and that when the duties are to be paid by the
vendee, there is no delivery until they are actually paid; that
when the delivery order is signed, the " request note" (answering
to our withdrawal entry) under their practice may be signed either
by the vendor.or the vendee using the vendor's name, and thai as
then -nothiingremains to be done by the vendor, the delivery is
complete; that these principles are wholly unaffected by the
question whether there has been a transfer or not in the books of
the bonded warehouseman ; but that if our practice existed there,
requiring the withdrawal entry to be signed by the vendor, there
would be no delivery until it was signed, and the same rule would
be applied where the vendee agreed to pay duties until payment.
The New York cases and other authorities cited by the plaintiffs on the argument, when critically examined, accord with these
views.
In Cartwright v. Wilmerding, 24 N. Y. 529, GOULD, J., in
delivering the opinion of the court, says: "1To be .entitled to
enforce that receipt" (the warehouse-keeper's receipt) "they
needed to mak#e a withdrawal entry at the custom-house, which
withdrawal entry could by law be made only by the party in
whose name the merchandise was warehoused, or by some person
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duly authorized for the purpose by him; then pay the duties and
procure the custom-house permit.'"
"The warehousing permit * * * would regularly be followed
by the withdrawal entry; and the withdrawal entry (or the
EXCLUSIVE authority to make it), with the warehouse-keeper's
receipt, furnished to the holder the exclusive means and power of
obtaining the possession of the property meant to be pledged :"
"Id.530.
The exclusive "authority to make the withdrawal entry coupled
with the warehouse-keeper's receipt * * * come within the
ruling (2 Bosw. 444) that they .mustbe ' such documents as will
enable the pledgee with certainty at the proper time to reduce
the goods into his own possession," &c.: Id. 530.
And the court further held that on the facts as found, the withdrawal entry, though made four days after the advance by the
pledgee, "should be deemed to have been made at the time of
making the advances:" Id. 533.
It is quite evident that the court held that the making of the
withdrawal entry, or being furnished with exclusive authority to
make it, tog@ther with the warehouse-keeper's receipt, were essential to work a transfer of the legal possession, thi actual possession not having been changed. The-warehouse-keeper's receipt
is treated as ineffectual to produce such a result, until the withdrawal entry has been made or exclusive authority to make it has
been furnished.
The concurrence of the two facts was held to satisfy the ruling
expressed in 2 Bosw. 444, and to furnish "such documentary evidence of title as gives him (the party holding them) the exclusive control of the.possession," &c.: Id. 530.
it is quite clear, as it appears to us, from the opinion of the
court, that if the proper withdrawal entry had not been made, or
exclusive authority to make it'had not been furnished, the court
would have held the advances not to have been made upon such
documentary evidence of title as gave the exclusive control of the
possession.
The making of a proper withdrawal entry, or furnishing to.the
plaintiffs exclusive authority to make it, was indispensable in
order to enable the plaintiffs 'to obtain actual possession. The
defendants alone could make that entry or furnish such exclusive
authority. .So long as they forbore to do either, they controlled
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the possession as between themselves and the plaintiffs as bbso.
lutely and exclusively as if the goods were locked up in their own
store and the key of the store was in their pocket.
The case of Ialdron v. Romaine, 22 N. Y. 868, involved only
the question whether the property in the goods, or, in other words,
whether the title to them, had been vested in the purchaser sothat he
was liable to pay the contract price where they had been destroyed
by fire before they came into his exclusive actual possession. They'
had been withdrawn from the custom-house in New York, and for
warded in bond in a vessel selected by the purchaser, in order to
be transported out of the United States to Canada. The vendor
had "co m plied with the terms of sale" on his part. He had done
all that he had agreed to do.
The title to goods purchased may have become vested in the
purchaser, so as to make him liable for the price in the event of
their destruction by fire or other cause not imputable to any mis,
conduct or neglect of the seller before coming to the actual possession of the purchaser, and yet the seller's lien for the unpaid
purchase-money may not have been divested.
Thii proposition is well illustrated by many of the adjudged
cases, where the goods were in transiu-at the time when the
seller reclaimed them and resumed their possession for the unpaid
purchase-money.
Where a person residing at one place orders goods from a person residing at another, on a specified credit, and directs them tobe forwarded by a designated line of transportation, and the person to Whom the order is addressed accepts the proposition contained in it, and complies in all respects'with the terms of the
order, and notifies the other party that he has done so, there can
be no. doubt that if the goods are lost oi destroyed during the"
transit, the purchaser is liable for the price. The contract has
been consummated and the title to the goods has been transferred
to the purchaser, and yet if during the transit the purhaser
should become insolvent, the seller might stop the goods and
reclaim possession before the transit was ended. He might do
this, not for the reason wholly or in part that the title had not
become vested in the purchaser, but for the reason that although
it had become vested, it was vested subject to the right of the
seller, by reason of the insolvency occurring during the transit to
reclaim possession as security for the price of the goods.
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If in the case of .Harrisv. Pratt,17 N. Y. 249, the goads
had been lost between Liverpool and New York, there could be
no doubt of the liability of Hall Brothers for the price. The
risk of loss from a destruction of the goods sold attends upon the
title not upon the possession, where there is no special agreement
upon the subject: Terry v. Wheeler, 25 N. Y. 520, 524. The
fact, therefore, that in the event that the goods in question had
been consumed by fire in bond prior to the plaintiffs' failure, they
would nevertheless have been liable to the defendants for the price,
is not decisive of the non-existence of a right, nor necessarily
material in determining whether there was a right in the defendants to refuse, after the plaintiffs' insolvency, to make a withdrawal
entry without being first paid the balance of the contract price.
The remark of Chancellor WALWORTH in Mottram v. ffeyer,
5 Hill 632, to the effect that "1the law recognises his rights" (the
right of the 6wnter of goods in bond) "to sell or dispose of them
as he pleases, subject only to the custody of the officers of the
revenue for the security of the payment of the duties at the time
when by law those duties become due and payable," and the
observations of CLARKE, J., in Waldron v. Romaine, 22 N. Y.
3T0, and of GOULD, J., in Cartwrightv. Wilmeiding, 24 N. Y.
536-37, and other like observations in other cases upon the same
point, mean simply, as we understand them, that imported goods
while in the public store under the warehousing system established
by Congress can be bargained and sold, and the title to them
vested in different purchasers in succession, subject only to the
lien thereon for the payment of duties, as effectually as if the
duties had beeh paid and the goods released from bond before such
contracts of sale were made.
But that proposition does not affect the question whether a purchaser of goods thus situated at the time of his purchase has, on
a given state of facts, been furnished with such means and power
of obtaining the possession of 'them, as gives to him, as between
him and the seller,.the exclusive control of the possession.
The duty to make..a ,withdrawal entry and give an order on
Snyder & Sons to deliver the goods to the plaintiffs whenvevdr
they, in accordance with the terms of the contracti requested
these acts to be doneis a duty incurred by the contract of August
20th 1867. Until these acts had been done, that contract had not
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been fully perfoimed on the part of the defendants. Until then,
the plaintiffs had not acquired, as between them and the defendants, the legal possession or obtained the exclusive control of the
possession. They could not obtain this exclusive control as
against the defendants themselves, unless nor until the latter
should make a withdrawal entry or furnish to the plaintiffs exclusive authority to make it.
It is not material,, according to principle or authority, whether
the situation of the goods by reason of which the plaintiffs could
neither obtain their possession nor control their exclusive possession, arose from the provisions of the Warehousing Act to which
the goods were subjeci when the contract was made, or from
causes wholly created by and within .the control of the defendants.
The goods were so situated when the contract was made, that
the plaintiffs could neither obtain actual possession, nor divest the
defendants of the capacity and power to prevent the- plaintiffs
from obtaining possession until a withdrawal entry, authorizing
the plaintiffs to withdraw the goods, had been made by the defendants, or until the latter had furnished them with exclusive authority to make such entry.
Although the amount of the duties was in form credited to the
plaintiffs as a payment of that amount of the contract price, yet
the duties on the goods remaining in bond had not been actually
paid. The goods could not be withdrawn until payment -was
made, and the existence of a withdrawal entry would be useless"
in that regard, except for the purpose of releasing the goods from
custom-house control on the duties being paid. The good sense
of the contract is, that the withdrawal entry should be made when
the duties were paid, or the plaintiffs were'ready and offering to
pay on such entry being made.
Although the act of paying the duties by the plaintiffs to the
government would in a certain sense be an act done by one of the
parties to this contract to a third party (the government), yet as
between these parties it would, within the spirit and meaning of
the contract, be an act, taking place between the parties to the
contract.
Paying the duties would be paying the contract price pro tanto
according to its clear legal import, and would be an act in diminu.
tion and discharge pro tanto of the liability of the defendants
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and their surety upon the bond given by them on warehousiig
the goods. This act precedes delivery, which remains inchoate
and imperfect untiL the payment is made -by the vendee, whenever
he has agreed to make it: Winks v. Hassall, supra.
The question, therefore, is not whether the contract had been
consummated so that the title to the goods had vested in the
plaintiffs. The whole law of the vendor's lien for the unpaid
purchase-money is based on the idea that the title to the goods
has been vested in the purchaser. The lien, as it is called, which
exists, is a lien on the purchaser's property. It is certainly not
a'lien" on the vendor's own property.
Hence it is said in Arnold v. Delano, 3 Cush. 33, 38, that
"theie is manifestly a marked distinction between those acts
which, as between vendor and vendee, upon a contract of sale, go
to make a constructive delivery and to vest the property in the
vendee, and that actual delivery by the vendor to the vendee
which puts an end to the right of the yendor fo hold the goods as
security for the price." In that case the title had been changed,
bu't the goods were on the vendor's premises ; and although the
vendee might, at any time prior to his insolvency, have removed
them without any aid or facility being furnished' by the vendor,
yet he had not done so, and the vendor was permitted to retain
them as against the general creditors of the vendee, for whose
benefit his property had been vested in an assignee.
This right to retain or stop in transitu,on the vendee becoming
insolvent, is a right resulting from the contract of sale, and is as
truly apart of it as if it were in terms stipulated in the contract
itself.
Hence it is said -in Myles v. Gorton, 2 Crompt. & Mees. 504.
511, that "1the general rule of law is, that where there is a sale
of goods, and nothing is specified' as to delivery or payment,
although everything may have been done to divest the property
out of the vendor, and so as to throw upon the vendee all risk
attendant upon the goods, still there results to the vendor o2it of
the original contract a right to retain the goods until paymeiit of
the price :" vide White v. Welsh, 2 Wright, Penna. St. R., 896.
The vendor's lien is not divested merely because the-goods may
have gone out. of his-actual possession.' This is true of all goods
stopped in transitu while being carried by a common carrier, or
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in the hands of some middleman. The general rule is, that the
consignor may stop the goods before they come into the possession
of the consignee: BoAtlingk v. Inglis, 3 East 381. This pos.session, it was said in -Ellisv. Hunt, 3 Durnford and East 466,
means actual possession: to constitute an actual possession by
the vendee the goods must be either literally in his actual possession, or in the actual possession of his agent or servant for him,
under such circumstances that the vendee has the exclusive means
and power of controlling the actual possession.
The case of Cowasjee v. Thompson,.5 Moore P. 0. 170, which
was so confidently relied upon in the plaintiffs' argument, turned
upon such special -eir'umstandes that it is of little value as a precedent. In that case goods were contracted to be sold and deliWhen this language is used, the buyer
vered "free on board."
is, by the English practice, deemed to be the shipper instead of
the seller. The effect of this language may be obviated by adding
the words "for and on account of the seller," or their equivayder, 6 Taunt. 433. The goods were to be
lent: Crann v.
paid for by cash or bills of exchange, at the option of the seller.
In case he took cash, he was to submit to 2j per cent. discount.
The seller elected to take the bills instead of cash. When the
lighterman of the seller placed the goods on board ship, he took
receipts from the mate and. handed them over to the seller. The
court beld that the delivery "free on board," and the election to
take "payment by a bill, made a complete delivery. The seller
had no right to the receipts, as he had been paid, andhe might be
compelled in equity to surrender them.. The court say, "payment in cash would have been made if the sellers had preferred
to lose 2j per cent. discount, therefore thQy never can be heard
to set up the receipts against the purchaser. They are bound to
give them up in good conscience, and would have been compelled
in equity," &c., p. 174. This case has plainly no analogy to
,he one now under discussion. In Berndston v. Strang, 26 Law
Journal N. S. Ch. 879, Sir W. PAGE WOOD, V.-C., says of this
case, "there a ship was sent out, goods were ordered for that
ship, and the ship being the property of the person sending her
out, the transitus was complete when the goods were delivered
on board, pursuant to order, nothing .else being directed or
This is, no doubt, a correct version of
intended by anybody."
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the case, except the matter of the receipts, and that was disposed
of by the fact of payment.
The result is, that the goods in question, when the contract
was made, were in bond deliverable only to the order of the defendants, and remained in that place and position up to the time
of the plaintiffs' insolvency. The plaintiffs could not obtain possession of them without the defendants doing an act which by the
legal import and effect of the contract of.sale they undertook to
do, in part execution of the contract, when the occasion called
for it. That act has not been done by the defendants. They
have not signed a withdrawal entry authorizing the plaintiffs to
withdraw the goods and take possession of' them, nor have they
furnished to the plaintiffs any authority to make such entry. In
our view of the law, upon the facts proved, the defendafits have a
right to retain the goods as a security for the unpaid purchasemoney.
There'is another difficulty in the way of the plaintiffs. This is
an action in equity, and must be maintained either on-the theory
of au action for specific performance or for the enforcement of a
trust. On the first theory, it would be necessary to tender the
price, in accordance with the ordinary practice in such cases, as
the vendee is just as truly a trustee of the purchase-money as the
vendor of the subject 'of safe. If the claim- is, that there is a
trust, the answer is, that this cannot arise in the ease of ordinary
chattels until the goods are paid for, or the vendor is estopped as
against third persons .to say that they are not paid for: Pooley
v.Budd, 14 Beavan S4, 45, 46, 47. This case explains the
remark of Lord BROUGHAM in Cowasjee v. Thompson,. supra, on
his theory that the gobds had been paid for, that the receipts
were held by the vendor in such a manner that he could be required, in equity, to surrender them. The vendees in the present
case being insolvent, anid having made no payment, could consequently have no relief in this court.
Such judgments must, therefore, be given as will protect the
right of the defendants to retain the goods for the unpaid pride.

VL.. XVI -44

690

IN RE DEVOE.

United States Diistrict Court-Distrietof MassacTusetts.
IN RE JAMES B. DEVOE.'
Where a bankrupt is held under arrest upon state process, in an action of tort
in the nature of deceit, it being alleged in the declaration, that he obtained
possession of the plaintiff's goods under color of a contrhct by means of false and
fraudulent representations., the United States District Court has no power to discharge the bankrupt upon a habeas corpus..
Evidence cannot be received to contradict the -declaration, and to show that no
-such cause of action really exists as is therein set forth.

0. A.

-

G. .L Reed, for the petitioner.

A. Russ, for the respondent.
LOWELL, J.-The petitioner alleges that he was duly adjudged
a bankrupt by the District Court of the Southern District of New
York, on the 26th day of May last, and that. pending the proceedings in bankruptcy, to wit, June 1st 1868, he was arrested in this
city, in a civil action, at the suit of one John C. Nicholas, and is
still iinprisoned on the writ then issued, and that the action is
founded on a debt or claim from which his discharge in bankruptcy
would release him. A writ of habeas corTus was issued in accordancewith Rule 27 of the Supreme Court rules in bankruptcy ; and
by the return,. it appears that the writ contains a declaration in
tort in the nature of deceit, alleging certain false and fraudulent
representations and inducements, whereby the present petitioner
is said to have procured from the plaintiff an assignment of a
complete stock-in-trade, including goods, choses in action, &c., in
exchange for a note averred to be of much less value than was
represented, if not wholly worthless.
-The jurisdiction of this court over the subject-matter, and the
pendency of the proceedings -in bankruptcy, in -New York, are
admitted, and the question argued, is whether this is such 'an
arrest as is prohibited by section 26 of the Bankrupt Act. And
this may be divided into two questions: 'first, whether the declaration shows a debt which would be discharged by the certificate ;
and second, if not, whether evidence can be received to contradict the declaration, and to show that no such cause of action
really exists as is there set out, buf only a debt provable in bankI We are indebted for this case to the Bankrupt Register.-EDs. Am. L. R.
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ruptcy, and discharged by the certificate, if any cause of action
there be.
By section 19, all demands against a bankrupt, for or on
account of any goods or chattels, wrongfully taken, converted, or
withheld by him, may be proved and allowed as debts to the
amount of the value of the property so taken or withheld, with
interiest, and by a subsequent clause of the same section the court
may cause such damages, if liquidated, to be assessed in such
mode as it may deem best, and the sum so assessed may be
proved. The declaration, in this case, is not very artificially
drawn, but it seems clear that the gist of the action is the fraud
and not the conversion. The facts alleged might be sufficient to
show-that a merely voidable title had been obtained to the property, out of which the plaintiff declares himself to have been
defrauded, and.if he had elected so to do, he might perhaps have
avoided the -sale, and have maintained trover for the goods and
chattels) but he could not have done so for the book debts, and
he naturally preferred to declare for his whole damages in one
action, and accordingly he has not declared in trover. - Another
answer to this part of the case is, that trover could not be maintained, excepting upon the ground that the fraud would authorize
the plaintiff to rescind the bargain and demand back the goods,
and in that case the goods considered as a debt provable iti bankruptcy would be one created by the fraud of the bankrupt, which,
by section 33, would not be discharged by the certificate, though
it would perhaps be provable. If proVed, all actions must be
stayed by section 21, but this debt has not been proved; and this
brings us to the main point of dispute.
The petitioner contends that he has the right to aver'and prove,
in reply to this return, that the allegations of fraud contained in
the plaintiff's declaration are false, and that the. plaintiff has no
just cause of action whatever' against him on the footing of a
fraud.
This point is not open to the petitioner. The words of the
statute are, that no bankrupt shall be liable to arrest during the
pendency of the proceedings in bankruptcy, in any civil.actioA,
unless the same is founded on some debt or claim from which his
discharge in bankruptcy would not release him. Now upon
inspection of this writ, it appears to be founded on such a claim ;
namely a claim of damages for deceit. Whether that claim "s
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well or ill founded, is a question which must be left to the tribunal
before which the case is brought; it is impossible that I should
try it on habeas corpus. Suppose the declaration were for dam.
ages in trespass or case, slander or assault, it is very plain that I
could not inquire on habeas corpus whether any assault or slander
had been committed; even the court before whom the case is
pending could not do that. And this is admitted in argument.
But how does it vaiy the case, that the action is founded on a
fraud, which the petitioner says never was committed ? If no
fraud was committed, the plaintiff has no just cause of action
concerning the matters -declared on ; but that does not show that
the action is founded on f debt or claim from which the discharge
in bankruptcy would release him, but only that it has no foundation whatever.
It is said that Judge BLATCHFORD has decided, that the District
Court will, on habeas corpus, inquire into the fact of fraud, and
uphold or discharge the arrest according to the result of the
inquiry: Be Kimball, 6 Int. Rev. Record 215 ; Be Glazer, 1
Bankrupt Register 73; but in both these cases the action was
founded upon a simple contract debt, which, on its face, would be
provable and discharged in bankruptcy, and the arrest only was
founded on exparte affidavits of fraud.
And if -I am.rightly informed of the New York practice, such
an arrest might be 'discharged by the court that ordered it, and
perhaps by some other.courts, upon just such a preliminary hearing as Judge BLATCHFORD granted. if so, it was of no special
consequence, whether the one court or the other should undertake
that investigation-both having jurisdiction of assets of bankrupts. The course taken was certainly a liberal one for the cre-.
ditor, who had not in terms founded his action on the fraud; but
it would seem to work equal and exact justice under the operation
of the laws of arrest in New York. I am not sure, that in this
district the creditor must not stand or fall on the record, on which
he causes the arrest to be made. But in this case, the whole
foundation of the action is the fraud, and the arrest is only an
incident, not depending at all on the fraud, but on the fact that
the defendant is a non-resident; and to try the question of fraud
is to try not merely the validity of the arrest, but the whole case.
This action is a civil action, but it is not founded on any debt,
excepting in the very largest sense, certainly not on any provable
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and dischargeable debt; and if every allegation in the writ be
wholly false and malicious, still it is a matter with which this
court has not, under this part of the law, any more concern than
if the petitioner were not a bankrupt. I have no authority, in
this summary mode, to relieve from imprisonment on state process
.persons who, whether bankrupts or not, are unjustly charged concerning matters not coming within my cognisance. What remedies there may be in such an extreme case it is not necessary to
inquire.
It is strongly urged, by the provisions of statute 5th February
f867 (14 St. 385), sect. 1, that the petitioner may aver and
prove any facts which tend to show that he is unjustly detained,
undei the forms of law and under state authority, in contravention of the Constitution or laws of the United States. That
statute enlarges the jurisdiction of this court, and gives *me
power to hear and determine this case, and it certainly intends
that the return to the writ should not be conclusive,.but that the
real facts of the detention may be shown by evidence. But I do
mo i understand, that it expects a judge to decide the merits of a
case on habeas corpus. In deciding that the ariest of the petitioner is not prohibited by'the Bankrupt Law, I have not decided
that lie is not imprisoned in contraveiition of the very law of the
United States that has been relied on for his release.

District Court of thle United States, -Eastern-District of
Pennsylvania.
IN THE MATTER OF WILLIAM LEEDS, AN ALLEGED BANKRUPT.
In deciding whether giving a warrant to'confess judgment is an act of bankruptcy, the character, &c., of the alleged bankrnpt's business may be taken into
consideration.
A suspension of payment of commercial paper for fourteen days is not, unless
fraudulent, an act of bankruptcy.

THE alleged bankrupt was a dealer in live stock. His business
done- through bank alone had exceeded $500,000 per- annum.
His real estate, worth about $8000, was encumbeied -to th
amount of less than half its value. The alleged acts of bankruptcy were giving a warrant to confess judgment, and a suspension of payment of his commercial paper fdr fourteen days.
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By the Court,
CADWALADER, J.-The case has been ably argued.

The

peculiar character of the business in which the alleged bankrupt
was engaged, must be principally considered. He had no such
stock-in-trade as would be swept away through the necessary or

ordinary effect of an execution upon a judgment under a warrant
of attorney. His real estate was moreover of sufficient value to
constitute an available partial security for such a judgment.
The former course of his transactions also shows that the purpose of the warrant of attorney, which constitutes one of the
alleged acts of bankruptcy, may probably have been to enable
him to continue -his business. The application of much of the
evidence would, in an ordinary case, therefore, be different from
its application to the case before me. After some hesitation, I
have concluded, that there was neither such an intended preference, nor such an intent to defeat or delay the operation of the
Bankrupt Law, as to make this warrant o'f attorney a sufficient
ground for the adjudication asked.
The other alleged act of bankruptcy, is a suspension of payment of his commercial paper for a period of fourteen days. I
am now required to decide whether, in the absence of any fraud,
such a suspension is an act of bankruptcy. This question has, in
some cases, been heretofore submitted to me without argument.
The decision§" in other districts had been, that the suspension of
payment of such paper, though not fraudulent, was, if continued
for this period, an act of bankruptcy. I was not prepared to
make definitively such a decision. In the cases which were thus
submitted without argument, I followed the decisions in the oIther
districts ; but stated on the record in every case, that the adjudication was not to be considered as a precedent. In the case now
before me, the question has been argued. In the mean time the
point has been decided by Judge FIELD, in the district of New
Jersey (Be The Jersey City Window- Glass Co., ante 419),
somewhat differently from the decisions in other districts to which
I have referred. My opinion is that the suspension of payment,
unless fraudulent, is not an act of bankruptcy, and that in this
case it does not appear to have been fraudulent.
The petition is dismissed, but without costs.

RE PETTIS.

United States District Court, Northern District of New York.
RE JULIUS R. PETTIS.
A debt fraudulently contracted is not discharged by an adjudication of bank.
ruptcy, and the Court of Bankruptcy will not therefore interfere, to prevent the
creditor from enforcing his claim, by imprisonment: even during the pendency of
the proceedings in bankruptcy, unless such interference be necessary to enable the
court to, exercise its proper authority and jurisdiction in the case.

IN this case the bankrupt applied for an -order staying the

issue of an execution against his body, upon a judgment obtained
against him by Richard J. Connor and Charles J. Richardson, of
the city of New York.
This motion was opposed, on the ground that the judgment was
obtained for a debt created by the fraud, of the bankrupt.
B. W. Townsend and OoinweUl, for Pettis.
aanson & Smith. and B. C. Thayer, for judgment-creditors.
- HALL, J.-The judgment against the petitioner, under which
he anticipates arrest, appears to have been rendered upon a debt
created. by fraud of the bankrupt, and the 33d -section of the
Bankrupt Act expressly provides that no such debt shall be discharged under that act. The 26th section, which provides for
the production or examination of the bankrupt in case he is imprisoned, and whicl provides that no bankrupt shall be liable, to
arrest during the pendency of the proceedings in bankruptcy, in
any civil action, unless the same is founded on some debt or
claim, from which his discharge in bankruptcy would not release
him, shows that he is not to be considered as absolutely privileged
from arrest, and as the Court in Bankruptcy has no power to discharge the judgment, it should nof interfere to prevent its enforce.
ment by imprisonment, unless -it be necessary to enable the Bankrupt Court to exercise its proper authority and jurisdiction in the
casd. The effect of the protection which the register is authorized to grant is not now under consideration, and the present
motion is disposed of without reference to the extent of that. pro.
tection, and without determining any question other than that
directly in controversy.
The motion is denied, but as this is the first time the question
has been presented it is without costs.

